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ABSTRACT
The popularity of Tor as an anonymity system has made
it a popular target for a variety of attacks. We focus on traffic
correlation attacks, which are no longer solely in the realm of
academic research with recent revelations about the NSA and
GCHQ actively working to implement them in practice.
Our first contribution is an empirical study that allows
us to gain a high fidelity snapshot of the threat of traffic
correlation attacks in the wild. We find that up to 40% of
all circuits created by Tor are vulnerable to attacks by traffic
correlation from Autonomous System (AS)-level adversaries,
42% from colluding AS-level adversaries, and 85% from state-
level adversaries. In addition, we find that in some regions
(notably, China and Iran) there exist many cases where over
95% of all possible circuits are vulnerable to correlation
attacks, emphasizing the need for AS-aware relay-selection.
To mitigate the threat of such attacks, we build Astoria–an
AS-aware Tor client. Astoria leverages recent developments in
network measurement to perform path-prediction and intelli-
gent relay selection. Astoria reduces the number of vulnerable
circuits to 2% against AS-level adversaries, under 5% against
colluding AS-level adversaries, and 25% against state-level
adversaries. In addition, Astoria load balances across the Tor
network so as to not overload any set of relays.
I. INTRODUCTION
Tor is a popular anonymity system for users who wish
to access the Internet anonymously or circumvent censor-
ship [15]. The increasing popularity of Tor has recently made
it a high-value target for blocking and denial of service [13],
[29], [43] and traffic correlation attacks to deanonymize
users [24], [25], [30], [31], [37]. Traffic correlation attacks,
which correlate traffic entering the Tor network with traffic
exiting it, are no longer solely in the realm of academic
research with recent revelations about the NSA and GCHQ
actively working to implement them in practice, in collusion
with Internet Service Providers (ISPs) [3], [5], [7].
Traffic correlation attacks have been shown to be feasible
and practical for network-level attackers. Specifically, a traffic
correlation attack may be implemented by any autonomous
system (AS) that lies on both the path from the Tor client
to the entry relay and on the path from the exit relay to the
destination. Previous studies have demonstrated the potential
for this type of attack [16], [18], [25]. Proposed defenses
include relay selection strategies to avoid ASes that are in
a position to launch them [9]. However, recent work [41] has
shown that these strategies perform poorly in practice.
The threat of network-level adversaries has been exacer-
bated by a recent study which highlights that the set of ASes
that are in a position to perform traffic correlation analysis
is potentially much larger due to asymmetric routing, routing
instabilities, and intentional manipulations of the Internet’s
routing system [39], [40]. These attacks significantly raise
the bar for relay-selection systems. Specifically, they require
the relay-selection system be able to accurately measure or
predict network paths in both the forward and reverse direction.
Measuring the reverse path between two Internet hosts is non-
trivial, especially when the client does not have control over
the destination, as is commonly the case for popular Web
services. While solutions for measuring reverse paths have
been proposed [27], they are still not widely deployed or
available.
In this paper, we make contributions in two dimensions.
First, we quantify the threat posed by these new attacks.
Second, we develop a relay selection method to minimize their
impact.
Measuring the threat faced by Tor. We leverage up-to-
date maps of the Internet’s topology [23] combined with
algorithmic simulations [22] to predict which ASes are in
a position to perform traffic correlation analysis on forward
or reverse paths. We validate this technique and show that it
provides a reasonable estimate on the threat faced from AS-
level attackers. We then augment our analysis with techniques
to identify ASes owned by a single organization (sibling ASes)
in order to gain a clearer picture of which ASes are likely to
collude with each other. This provides a more complete picture
of network-level threats than previous work. In addition, we
consider the threat from state-level attackers that have insight
into traffic transiting through all regional ASes. Through these
techniques and our experiments, we make the following key
observations:
• Up to 40% of circuits constructed by the current Tor
client are vulnerable to network-level attackers.
• Up to 37% of all sites in our study, when loaded from
Brazil, China, Germany, Spain, France, England, Iran,
Italy, Russia, and the United States had main page
requests that were reached via a vulnerable path (i.e., a
path that contained network-level entities in a position
to launch traffic correlation attacks), when loaded by
the vanilla Tor client.
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• Connections from China were found to be most vul-
nerable to network-level attackers with up to 86% of
all Tor circuits and 56% of all main page requests
to sites in the study being vulnerable to colluding
network-level attackers.
• For up to 8% of the requests generated from China and
Iran, over 95% of all possible Tor constructed circuits
were vulnerable to correlation attacks by network-
level attackers.
• Reducing the number of entry guards can result in an
increase in vulnerability of Tor circuits. In particular,
we found that using a single guard significantly in-
creases the threat from traffic correlation attacks, while
the difference between using two and three guards is
marginal.
• State-level attackers are in a position to launch cor-
relation attacks on up to 85% of all Tor constructed
circuits.
Mitigating the threat of AS-level adversaries. We propose,
construct, and evaluate Astoria– an AS-aware Tor client that
includes security and relay bandwidth considerations when
creating Tor circuits. Astoria is the first AS-aware Tor client
to consider the recently proposed asymmetric correlation at-
tacks [39], [40]. When there are safe alternatives, Astoria
actively avoids using circuits on which asymmetric correlation
attacks might be launched. It also leverages methods for
identifying sibling ASes [10] when determining whether or not
a given circuit is safe. In the absence of a safe path, Astoria
uses a linear program to minimize the threat posed by any
adversary. Finally, Astoria considers the bandwidth capabilities
of relays while making AS-aware relay selection decisions.
When there are multiple safe relay selections, Astoria aims
to be a good network citizen and distributes load across Tor
relays in the same manner as the vanilla Tor client. Therefore,
in spite of selecting safer relays, Astoria will not overload any
single set of relays.
Paper outline. In Section II we briefly overview how the
current Tor client performs relay selection and circuit construc-
tion, describe the current state of research in relay selection
for Tor, and introduce our adversary model. In Section III
we describe the components of our measurement toolkit used
for detecting network-level attackers on Tor circuits. We then
present some interesting results regarding the vulnerability of
Tor constructed circuits and the general potential for attack by
single AS-, sibling AS-, and state-level attackers. In Section
IV, we present the details of our AS-aware client – Astoria. A
performance and security evaluation of Astoria is performed in
Section V. In Section VI, we discuss the known shortcomings
of Astoria and motivate directions for future research on AS-
aware clients. We make our conclusions in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
We now provide background on Tor relay selection, related
work in this area, and our adversary model.
A. Tor relay selection
The Tor anonymity network consists of approximately
6,000 relays (Tor routers). Most requests made through a Tor
client are sent to their destination via a three-hop path known
as a circuit. Each circuit consists of an entry, middle, and exit
relay. The entry-relay communicates directly with the client
and the exit-relay communicates with the destination. The
fundamental idea is that no single relay in the circuit learns
the source and destination.
In its early days, Tor selected relays for each circuit hop
uniformly at random from the set of available relays. This was
changed in order to improve performance (by preferring to
route through higher bandwidth relays [8]) and security [11].
In today’s Tor network, based on certain performance char-
acteristics such as reliability, bandwidth served, and up-time,
relays may earn certain flags that make them a preferential
choice for various roles during circuit construction.
One such flag is the guard flag. New relays joining the
Tor network are monitored for stability and performance via
remote measurements for a period of up to eight days [4]. At
this point, relays that have demonstrated stability and reliability
are assigned a guard flag. Relays with a guard flag earn the
ability to serve as the entry-relay to the Tor network. By default
the Tor client selects three guards to be used as entry-relays
for all circuits for a prolonged period of time. The main ideas
behind the selection of a fixed set of entry-relays are (1) to
reduce the possibility that a client will select an entry- and
exit-relay operated by the same entity (after prolonged use),
(2) prevent attacker-owned entry-relays from denying service
to clients that are not also using an exit-relay owned by the
attacker, and (3) increase the cost to an attacker that wishes
to be chosen as an entry-relay, by requiring them to earn the
guard flag [4].
In addition to picking relays that are more stable and
reliable, for other locations on a circuit, the Tor client also
requires that (1) no two routers on a circuit share the same /16
subnet and (2) no routers in the same family (as advertised by
the router) may be chosen on the same circuit. [8].
B. Related work
The threat of correlation attacks by AS-level adversaries on
the Tor network was first identified and empirically evaluated
by Feamster and Dingledine [18] in 2004, when the Tor
network had only 33 relays and significantly different relay
selection algorithms. The study revealed that 10-30% of all
circuits constructed by Tor had a common AS that could
observe both ends of the circuit. Shortly after, by constructing
efficient traffic correlation attacks while considering network-
level adversaries, Murdoch and Danezis [30] and Murdoch
and Zielin´ski [31] demonstrated that the threat from AS-level
attackers was one of practical concern. In 2009, Edman and
Syverson [16] found that the threat of AS-level adversaries
had not reduced since [18], in spite of revised relay selection
strategies and substantially larger number of relays in the
network.
In addition, Edman and Syverson [16] were the first to
consider threats from network-level attackers due to the asym-
metric nature of Internet routing. Using the 2009 topology of
the Internet, AS paths inferred by Qiu’s algorithm [32], and
AS relationships inferred by Gao’s algorithm [20] they found
that in their experiments up to 39% of all Tor circuits were
vulnerable to network-level adversaries that performed attacks
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Fig. 1: Standard and reverse-path traffic correlation attacks. In the
standard traffic correlation attack, AS2 must observe the direction of
the connection that data is flowing on (forward path). In the reverse-
path traffic correlation attack AS2 can infer the data flow using ACK
numbers on the reverse path.
on forward- and reverse-paths. Most recently, Vanbever et al.
[40] and Sun et al. [39], presented RAPTOR, an AS-level
attack integrating BGP interception with the first correlation
attack that takes advantage of the asymmetric nature of Internet
routing, to exactly de-anonymize Tor users with up to 90%
accuracy in just 300 seconds. Similarly, Johnson et al. [25] per-
formed an empirical evaluation of the effect of network-level
adversary bandwidth investment strategies, Tor client location,
and Tor client use (e.g., for IRC, browsing, BitTorrent, etc.).
They found that a network-level adversary could effectively
de-anonymize most Tor users within six months with very
low bandwidth costs. These works emphasize the need for Tor
relay selection strategies to consider ASes that lie both, on
the forward- and reverse-paths between the (client, entry) and
(exit, destination).
Perhaps most closely related to our work, in terms of
end-goals and evaluation methodology, Akhoondi et al. [9],
constructed LASTor, a Tor client which explicitly considered
AS-level attackers and relay locations while constructing Tor
circuits. While LASTor appeared to successfully reduce path
latencies and the probability of common ASes at either end of
the Tor circuits, it neglected the capacity of relays selected by
the system. Relay capacity is an important variable to consider
to ensure that custom relay selection schemes do not overload
a small set of relays, therefore reducing the performance of
the entire network. Their evaluation, based on only HTTP
HEAD requests (as opposed to complete webpage loads), did
not stress the system sufficiently to reveal the issues associated
with capacity-agnostic relay selection. Further, LASTor does
not consider an adversary that may (1) collude with other ASes
or operate at the state-level, and/or (2) only need to be on one
of the asymmetric path segments between source and entry-
relay; and exit-relay and destination (e.g., RAPTOR).
C. Adversary model
In the standard view of traffic correlation attacks, an AS
needs to lie on the forward path1 between the source and
destination (i.e., on the solid green colored path segments in
Figure 1 (a)). With this point the adversary (AS 2) can view
the packet sizes and timings as transmitted from the source to
destination, going-into and coming-out-of the Tor network and
directly perform a traffic correlation attack.
1Here we use ‘forward path’ to refer to the direction of data flow in the
TCP connection
However, recent work by Vanbever et al. [40] and Sun et
al. [39] highlights the fact that an adversary on the reverse
path may also learn packet size and timing information via
the TCP Acknowledgement (ACK) field. Figure 1(b) illustrates
this case. AS 2 can directly observe packet timings between the
source and entry-relay AS (Entry AS), but can only observe
ACKs from the destination back to the exit-relay AS (Exit
AS).
In this view, an adversary has the potential to launch
a traffic correlation attack on a Tor circuit as long as the
following criteria are satisfied:
Let psrc→entry = {AS1, AS2, . . . , ASn} be the set of
ASes on the path from the source (Tor client) to the selected
entry-relay (this set includes the entry-relay AS), pentry→src =
{AS′1, AS′2, . . . , AS′m} be the set of ASes on the path from the
entry-relay back to the source, and pentry↔src = pentry→src∪
psrc→entry. We similarly define paths to and from the exit-
relay and destination (e.g., a popular content provider, or other
Web service) as pexit→dst, pdst→exit, and pexit↔dst.
We say that a Tor circuit is vulnerable to a traffic correlation
attack if there exists an AS Ai such that:
Ai ∈ {psrc↔entry ∩ pexit↔dst} (1)
Similar to prior work on relay selection, we assume that our
adversary is an autonomous system (AS), or an entity working
with the cooperation of ASes (e.g., governments). However,
while all previous work only considers the standard view of
network attacks, we also consider attackers that may lie on the
reverse-path, as described above. In addition, we also include
the possibility that some sets of ASes may collude with each
other to de-anonymize Tor users. Specifically, we consider that
an AS may collude with sibling ASes [10] (i.e., other ASes
owned by the same organization) and ASes that may collude
with each other on behalf of a state-level adversary. Finally,
as part of our relay selection algorithms (Section IV), we
consider a probabilistic relay selection strategy that minimizes
the amount of traffic that is observable by any single attacker
over a period of time.
III. MEASURING ADVERSARY PRESENCE
In this section, we investigate the prevalence of the adver-
sary described in Section II. First, we detail how prediction
of AS paths between a source and a destination is performed
and how sets of potential attacking ASes are generated. Then
we present the experimental methodology used to make these
measurements. Finally, we present the results of these experi-
ments.
A. Predicting potential attacker ASes
Adversaries that can exploit asymmetric routing present a
challenge to measuring their prevalence. The addition of poten-
tial attackers on the reverse-path between a source and desti-
nation implies the need for identifying potential attackers (i.e.,
ASes) on the reverse-paths between the client and entry-relay
(and the exit-relay and destination). This poses a challenging
measurement problem, since reliably measuring information
about reverse-paths is currently not possible. While Reverse
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Traceroute [27] would be a useful tool for these measurements,
it is currently not widely deployed.
Additionally, since our measurement toolkit was assembled
with the goal of integration with our Tor client – Astoria
(Section IV), using external measurement and control-plane
mapping tools was not an option. This is because such tools
require knowledge of the clients’ intended destination – an
undesirable option for an anonymity tool such as Tor. Thus,
any measurement or path prediction needs to be performed on
the Tor client without leaking any information to attackers or
third party tools and service providers.
To address the challenges of reliably measuring reverse-
paths or use control-plane mapping tools, we employ an
efficient path prediction approach which leverages up-to-date
maps of the AS-level Internet topology [23], and algorithmic
simulations that take into account a common model of routing
policies [22].
AS-level topology. We perform path prediction using an
empirically-derived AS-level Internet topology. In this abstrac-
tion, the Internet is represented as a graph with ASes as
nodes and edges as connections between them. Connections
between ASes are negotiated as business arrangements and
are often modeled as two main types of relationship: customer-
provider where the customer pays the provider for data sent
and received; and settlement-free peering or peer-peer where
two ASes agree to transit traffic at no cost [21].
However, in practice AS relationships may violate this
simple taxonomy e.g., ASes that agree to provide transit for
a subset of prefixes (partial transit) or ASes that have dif-
ferent economic arrangements in different geographic regions
(hybrid relationships) [23]. It can also be the case that two
ASes are controlled by the same organization e.g., because
of corporate mergers such as Level 3 (AS3356) and Global
Crossing (AS3549) or organizations that leverage different AS
numbers in different regions such as Verizon (AS701, 702,
703). Additionally, integrating IXPs is a complicated research
subject due to a dearth of measurement data to inform how
they should be incorporated – e.g., just because two ISPs peer
at an IXP does not mean all paths including these ISPs will
traverse the IXP. The AS-level topology we leverage takes
partial transit and hybrid relationships into account, but ignores
IXPs (which would result in a significant over-estimation of
our measurements, due to their peering meshes). We use
techniques discussed and validated by Anwar et al. [10] for
detecting sibling ASes. This is done to identify ASes that are
likely to collude with each other.
Routing policies. Routing on the AS-graph deviates from
simple shortest path routing because ASes route their traffic
based on economic considerations. We use a standard model
of routing policies proposed by Gao and Rexford [21]. The
path selection process can be broken down into the following
ordered steps:
• Local Preference (LP). Paths are ranked based on
their next hop: customer is chosen over peer which
is chosen over provider.
• Shortest Paths (SP). Among the paths with the highest
local preference, prefer the shortest ones.
Src
AS
Entry ASes
…
Exit ASes
…
Tor DstAS
Forward path Reverse path
Fig. 2: Illustration of the AS paths that the client needs to predict,
note that these paths must be predicted for each potential entry and
exit relay in both the forward and reverse direction.
• Tie Break (TB). If there are multiple such paths, node
a breaks ties: if b is the next hop on the path, choose
the path where hash, H(a, b) is the lowest.2
This standard model of local preference [21] captures the
idea that an AS has incentives to prefer routing through a
customer (that pays it) over a peer (no money is exchanged)
over a provider (that it must pay).
In addition to selecting paths, ASes must determine which
paths they will announce to other ASes based on export
policies. The standard model of export policies captures the
idea that an AS will only load its network with transit traffic
if its customer pays it to do so [21]:
• Export Policy (EP). AS b announces a path via AS c
to AS a iff at least one of a and c are its customers.
Computing paths following these policies using simulation
platforms (e.g., CBGP [33]) can be computationally expensive
which limits the scale of analysis. Thus, we employ an
algorithmic approach [22] that allows us to compute all paths
to a given destination in O(|V |+|E|) where |V | is the number
of ASes and |E| is the number of edges.
Predicting paths. We use the routing policies and algorithmic
simulations [22] as described above to compute routes between
pairs of ASes using the AS-level topology published by
CAIDA [23]. AS-level path prediction between a source and
destination is a thorny issue, for example the recent work from
Juen, et al. [26] shows that the paths predicted by BGP-based
path prediction vary significantly from traceroute-based path
prediction. However, our BGP-based path prediction toolkit
makes use of the state-of-the-art in path inference and AS-
relationship inference that have both been extensively validated
with empirical measurements by Anwar et al. [10] and Giotsas
et al. [23].
In particular, Anwar, et al. [10] show that 65-85% of
measured paths are in the set of paths which satisfy LP and SP.
Thus, we modify the algorithmic simulator to return all paths
satisfying LP and SP simultaneously, instead of using TB to
produce a unique path. Thus we consider the set of ASes in
the set of paths satisfying LP and SP between a and b to be
the set pa→b.
Identifying vulnerable circuits. Let pisrc↔entry be the ith
LP and SP satisfying (forward- or reverse-) path between the
2In practice, this is done using the distance between routers and router
IDs. Since we do not incorporate this information in our model we use a
randomized tie break which prevents certain ASes from “always winning”.
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Fig. 3: Fraction of actually vulnerable paths from all possible paths,
for each of 20,000 circuits marked as vulnerable by our toolkit.
source and entry-relay, pjexit↔dst be the j
th such path between
the exit and destination, Psrc↔entry = ∪i{pisrc↔entry} , and
Pexit↔dst = ∪j{pjexit↔dst}. We refer to Pa↔b as the path-set
between a and b.
Since it is currently not possible to predict exactly which
path from P = Psrc↔entry ×Pexit↔dst will be utilized when
using a circuit with entry-relay entry and exit-relay exit,
we label all paths p ∈ P as vulnerable iff at-least one of
the paths in P is vulnerable (as defined in Eq. 1). That is,
once our path prediction toolkit returns the set of ASes that
occupy each path-set between the Tor client and a given entry-
relay (Psrc↔entry) and between the exit-relay and destination
(Pexit↔dst), potential circuits using the corresponding entry-
and exit-relay are labeled as vulnerable iff there are common
or sibling ASes on the (client, entry-relay) and (exit-relay,
destination) path-set – i.e., {Psrc↔entry ∩ Pexit↔dst} 6= ∅.
This provides an estimate on the threat posed by network-level
attackers.
To understand the tightness of this estimate, we analyzed
the fraction of the actually vulnerable paths in each of 20,000
unique “vulnerable” circuits generated by our experiments.
Figure 3 shows the result of this analysis. 25% of all circuits
had all their paths in P vulnerable to at-least one network-
level attacker and 56% of all circuits had at-least 50% of their
paths (in P) vulnerable to at-least one network-level attacker.
B. Measurement methodology and results
To understand the threat posed by the adversary described
in Section II, we performed several experiments. In particular,
our goal was to understand the threat faced by the Tor client
under various configurations, and in different network and
geographic locations.
Experimental setup. In our experiments, we consider the
fact that Tor users in different countries face different levels
of threats from local ASes. To this end, each experiment
was performed in 10 different countries: Brazil (BR), China
(CN), Germany (DE), Spain (ES), France (FR), England (GB),
Iran (IR), Italy (IT), Russia (RU), and the United States
(US). This list was obtained by considering the intersections
of the number of Tor users in each country [42] and the
Freedom House rankings for Internet freedom [19]. In order
to completely understand the threats faced by Tor users, five
experiments were conducted in each country; a summary of
each experiment is shown in Table I.
Vulnerable Vanilla Tor Uniform Tor
Websites (Main request) 37% 35%
Websites (Any request) 53% 69%
Circuits (All requests) 40% 39%
TABLE II: Summary of threat from asymmetric correlation
attacks against the vanilla Tor and uniform relay-selection strate-
gies for 200 websites in 10 countries.
For each experiment, 200 websites were loaded using the
Selenium Firefox webdriver [6]. The list of 200 websites
comprised of the local Alexa Top 100 sites [1] and 100
sensitive (i.e., likely to be blocked) pages obtained from the
Citizen Lab testing list repository [2] for each country.
Each experiment was conducted in one of two settings:
Live or Simulation. In the Live setting, the actual client (vanilla
Tor or Astoria) being studied was used to load pages from
within the respective country using a single VPN as the vantage
point. The VPN vantage point only presents a limited picture
of the threat faced by all users in the country (since it only
considers a single AS as the client location (source AS)), thus
we used simulations to augment the Live experiments. Each
simulation considered clients located in 100 randomly selected
ASes in each country.
For each experiment, logs were maintained to track: (1) the
list of available entry- and exit-relays during circuit construc-
tion, (2) the actual chosen entry and exit-relay for each circuit
constructed by the client, and (3) the list of requests made for
each site and the circuit used by the Tor client to serve the
request. Data from these logs were fed to our measurement
toolkit in order to identify (1) the set of attackers that threaten
actually constructed circuits (Live experiments) and (2) the
set of attackers that threaten potential circuits – i.e., circuits
that could have been constructed given a particular valid
combination of available entry- and exit-relays (Simulation
experiments).
E1: Measuring vulnerability to network-level attacks. This
experiment was conducted using the vanilla Tor client and a
modified Tor client using a uniform relay-selection strategy.
Both clients used the same VPN in each of the 10 countries
to load their corresponding Alexa top 100 and 100 sensitive
pages. Three statistics were measured: (1) The number of
websites which had the circuits carrying the request for their
main page being vulnerable, (2) the number of websites which
had any of their circuits being vulnerable, and (3) the total
number of vulnerable circuits.
A summary of these results are illustrated in Table II. We
see that both clients have similar number of compromisable
circuits, however the vanilla Tor client allows 16% more web-
sites to load without having any of their circuits compromised,
implying that when a website is loaded with the vanilla Tor
client it is either completely safe or has most of its content
loaded via a vulnerable circuit. This is due to the fact that
unlike the modified Tor client, the vanilla Tor client reuses a
small number of circuits for many requests.
We break down our results for the vanilla Tor client by
country in Figure 4. The figure shows the percentage of
websites that are vulnerable to asymmetric correlation attacks
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ID Question Answered Vantage Point Setting Results
E1 How vulnerable are circuits to asymmetric correlation attacks? VPN Live (3 guards) Figures 4, 14a and 14b
E2 How many attacker-free paths are available to the vanilla Tor client
in each country?
100 ASes per country Simulation (all entry- and exit-relays) Figures 14 and 6
E3 How much of a threat do colluding sibling ASes pose? VPN Live (3 guards) Figures 7, 14c, and 14d
E4 How much of a threat do state-level attackers pose? VPN Live (3 guards) Figures 8, 14e, and 14f
E5 Do guard settings have a significant effect on the availability of
attacker-free paths to the vanilla Tor client?
100 ASes per country Simulation (20 guard-sets of 1,2, and
3 guards and all exit-relays)
Figure 9
TABLE I: Summary of security experiment settings used for the evaluation of the vanilla Tor client and Astoria. For each country, all experiments
used a dataset containing the local Alexa Top 100 and 100 locally sensitive websites (obtained from the Citizen Lab testing repository [2]).
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Fig. 4: An estimate of the percentage of websites that have main page
requests and any requests serviced by a vulnerable Tor circuit.
on circuits built for serving the request for their main page
(GET) and for serving any request. We find that the threat
is not uniformly spread. Clients using the vanilla Tor client
from our VPN vantage point in three countries: China (CN),
Russia (RU), and the United States (US) were found to be most
vulnerable. This can be explained by the fact that of our 10
countries, the US, RU, and CN had the most amount of locally
hosted content (i.e., content hosted within the country). Of the
200 sites used for each of the countries, 95% (US), 57% (RU),
and 47% (CN) made requests to ASes within the country itself
– making it more likely for the same AS to be on paths from/to
client to/from entry-relay and exit-relay to/from destination.
E2: Measuring fraction of available attacker-free paths.
Since the results of our experiments on the live Tor network
were highly dependent on the location of the VPN, simulations
were required to understand the distribution of threat in other
locations within each country. To this end, for each country,
100 ASes were randomly selected as client locations and the
targets of the each of the requests generated by the 200 sites
(sensitive and popular) for each of our 10 countries were used
as destinations. The simulation toolkit generated a list of all
entry- and exit-relays available to each client for performing
the page load (using Tor client consensus data).
Each generated (source, entry, exit, destination) combina-
tion was then analyzed for the threat of attackers to understand
how many “safe” or “attacker-free” entry-exit pairs were
available. We see in Figure 14 the cumulative distribution
function of the fraction of attacker free entry-exit pairs for
each source-destination pair. Figure 5a shows this for the five
most vulnerable countries in our study, and 5b shows this for
the remaining countries.
China (CN) and Iran (IR) stand out as the most interesting
cases. First, we see that 8% of all source-destination pairs have
less than 10% of their entry-exit options being safe. Next, we
also notice that there are no known attackers present on 18%
of all source-destination pairs. This appears to indicate that
the threat of de-anonymization is non-uniform even within a
country, with certain client locations being much safer than
others.
In order to understand which set of websites are more
vulnerable in each of the countries, in Figure 6 we show the
percentage of source- destination pairs having fewer than 5%
safe circuit options for each set of websites. We find that in
all cases, the Alexa top 100 local websites have fewer safe
circuit options. This can be explained by the fact that locally
popular websites are likely to be hosted within a regional AS.
Additionally, we find that China and Iran have a significant
number of their source-destination pairs having fewer than 5%
safe circuit options – i.e., over 8% of the source-destination
pairs have less than 5% of all their circuit options being safe
from network-level correlation attacks.
However, in general, the results of E1 and E2 indicate
that although in most cases there are many safe entry-exit
options available to the Tor client, it often does not select these
options – leading to a large number of vulnerable circuits being
created.
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Fig. 6: (Logscale) Percentage of (source, destination) pairs having
fewer than 5% attacker-free (entry, exit) options in each country.
E3: Measuring the impact of sibling ASes. In this experi-
ment we consider the possibility that ASes owned by the same
organization (referred to as sibling ASes) may collude with
each other in order to de-anonymize Tor users via asymmetric
correlation attacks. We use data gathered by Anwar et al. [10]
to identify such ASes. The same setup as E1 was used.
We observe from Figure 7 that the increase in threat from
considering sibling ASes is marginal. Over the 10 countries,
only 3% additional websites from our list of 200 for each coun-
try had some request served by a circuit that was vulnerable to
asymmetric attacks by sibling ASes. However, the increase in
threat is not uniform. Clients in Brazil and Germany face an 8-
10% increase in vulnerable websites. This can be attributed to
the large telecom conglomerates operating within the countries
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Fig. 5: Distribution of the fraction of attacker-free circuits for 100 source ASes connecting to 200 websites in 10 different countries of interest.
More skewed to the right indicates the availability of more safe circuits.
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Fig. 7: An estimate of the percentage of websites that have any
requests served by a vulnerable Tor circuit when considering siblings.
– e.g., many paths from our vantage points in Germany and
Brazil were vulnerable to correlation attacks due to transiting
one of the large number of ASes owned by Telefonica (in
Spain) and Durand (in Brazil), respectively.
E4: Measuring the impact of state-level adversaries. In this
experiment we consider the threat that Tor clients face from
state-level adversaries. We assume that a state-level adversary
is able to gain insight into the traffic flowing through all ASes
operating within the state. Therefore, we consider a circuit
originating from country X to be vulnerable if its path to/from
its entry-relay and from/to the exit-relay to the destination
contains some AS operating within X. The same setup as E1
was used for data collection.
The results are broken down per country in Figure 8. Here,
we see that the situation is quite dire with 82% of all (over
all 10 countries) websites having their main page served by
a vulnerable circuit. In particular, clients in Brazil, China,
France, Iran, and the United States face the biggest threat from
state-level attacks with over 95% of their main page requests
being vulnerable to state-level attackers.
E5: Measuring the effect of guards. In this experiment we
consider the effect of the number of guards on the vulnerability
of Tor clients to network-level asymmetric correlation attacks.
For each of our 10 countries, 100 ASes were randomly selected
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Fig. 8: An estimate of the percentage of websites that have main
page requests or any requests served by a vulnerable Tor circuit when
considering state-level adversaries.
as client locations and the targets of all the requests generated
by the 200 websites in our earlier experiments were used as
the destinations. The simulation toolkit generated 60 unique
guard-sets (20 each for 3 guards, 2 guards, and 1 guard) in
an identical manner to the vanilla Tor client, and a list of all
exit-relays available to each client for performing the page
load (using Tor consensus data). Each (source, entry, exit,
destination) combination was checked for the presence of our
adversary.
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Fig. 9: Distribution of the fraction of attacker-free (entry, exit) pairs
for vanilla Tor with 3, 2, and 1 guard(s).
Figure 9 illustrates the effect that reducing the size of the
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guard-set has on the fraction of network-level attacker-free-
paths available to the Tor client.
While it is known that a smaller number of guards provides
better security against relay-level attackers in the long-term
[14], we see from the results of this experiment that the effect
is the opposite against network-level adversaries – i.e., as the
size of the guard-set decreases, Tor is more likely to select
a circuit vulnerable to network-level asymmetric correlation
attacks due to the reduced number of available safe paths.
In particular, when only 1 guard is used, over 15% of the
(source, destination) pairs in our experiment had no safe-
options, whereas the difference in security provided by two
or three guards was marginal. This experiment demonstrates
one of the conflicts between Tor clients geared for defending
against relay-level attackers and those geared for defending
against network-level attackers.
IV. ASTORIA: AN AS- AND CAPACITY-AWARE TOR
CLIENT
Motivated by the observation that vanilla Tor very often
selects entry-exit pairs that may be subject to asymmetric cor-
relation attacks, we seek to design a relay selection algorithm
to mitigate the opportunities for such attackers. We design our
relay selection system, Astoria, based on the idea of stochastic
relay selection. This works by having the Tor client generate
a probability distribution that minimizes the chance of attack
over all possible entry- and exit- relay selection choices, and
selecting an entry- and exit-relay based on this distribution.
The advantage of stochastic selection is that even if the client
has no safe options, relay-selection can be engineered to
minimize the amount of information gained by the adversary
over some period of time (as we show below). Further, it allows
clients to select relays in a way such that no set of relays in
the Tor eco-system is overloaded, even if every client uses the
same relay-selection strategy.
A. Astoria goals
Astoria is constructed with several security and perfor-
mance goals in mind:
• Deal with asymmetric attackers. Astoria avoids con-
structing circuits involving common ASes on the
forward- or reverse-paths between the client to the
entry-relay and the exit-relay and the destination.
• Deal with the possibility of colluding attackers. Asto-
ria considers the threat of ASes that may collude to
de-anonymize Tor users. Astoria can be configured to
build circuits that do not contain known to be collud-
ing ASes on the forward- or reverse-path between the
client and entry-relay and exit-relay and destination.
This mitigates the threat from sibling ASes and state-
level attackers.
• Consider the worst case possibility. Astoria uses a
probabilistic relay selection algorithm that ensures,
even in the worst-case (where there are no safe paths
to and from the entry- and exit-relay), that the ability
of a single AS (or, family of ASes) to de-anonymize
a large number of circuits is minimized.
AS2
Entry
AS1
AS1
Src
AS
Entry
AS2
Entry
AS3
Uniform Optimal
Entry 
AS1 1/3 1/4
Entry 
AS2 1/3 1/4
Entry 
AS3 1/3 1/2
Fig. 10: Example of optimizing relay selection. Simplified to unidi-
rectional paths and only entry-relay selection.
• Minimize performance impact. It is clear that any AS-
aware client will lose its ability to perform many op-
timizations such as pre-constructing circuits. Our goal
is to minimize the effect of the above considerations
on the performance of the Tor client.
• Be a good network citizen. Astoria takes into account
the capacities of all relays available in the Tor eco-
system and performs selection in a way that no single
set of relays are overloaded, even when all clients in
the network use the same relay-selection strategy.
B. Minimizing information gained by the adversary
While there often are cases when there is a relay selection
that will completely eliminate the risk of our adversary, we
develop our relay selection to be robust, even if this is not the
case. Further, with attacks implemented using BGP hijacking
and interception the number of unsafe paths may be higher
than what we observe in our analysis (we discuss this more in
Section VI).
To minimize the risk of correlation attacks, we define a
linear program which generates a probability for each relay
selection with the objective to minimize the maximum proba-
bility of a circuit encountering the attacker. Recall that in our
adversary model, we consider a long-lived adversary and that
minimizing the probability of an attacker may also be seen
as minimizing the number of circuits the adversary is able
to observe over a long period of time and numerous circuit
construction cycles.
Figure 10 shows an example of relay selection to give
intuition about how the LP minimizes the risk from the
attacker. In this example, we consider unidirectional paths and
only entry-relay selection for clarity. In the figure, if the source
were to choose uniformly at random across the three entry-
relays, there is a 2/3 chance that AS1 will be able to observe
traffic and only a 1/3 chance that AS2 will. In this case, the
optimal selection is intuitive, that the source should choose
entry-relays 1 and 2 with probability 1/4 each and entry-relay
3 with probability 1/2. This lowers the probability that AS1
can observe a circuit from 2/3 to 1/2. This probability of the
most likely adversary is the quantity that our LP minimizes.
We use the following notation:
• Let ADVi,j be the set of attackers on the circuit using
entry-relay i and exit-relay j to destination dest – i.e.,
∀A ∈ ADVi,j : A ∈ {psrc↔entryi ∩ pexitj↔dest}.
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• Let Xi,j,A be an indicator random variable for attacker
A on the circuit using entry-relay i and exit-relay j –
i.e., Xi,j,A = 1 ⇐⇒ A ∈ ADVi,j , and 0 otherwise.
• Let Pi,j be the probability that a client builds a circuit
using entry-relay entryi and exit-relay exitj .
The following linear program is used to minimize the
probability of the most likely attacker (i.e., the number of
circuits visible to the attacker).
minimize z
subject to z ≥
∑
i, j
(Pi,j Xi,j,A) ∀A ∈ ADVi,j
Pi,j ∈ [0, 1] , ∀i, ∀j ;
∑
i, j
Pi,j = 1
(2)
Essentially, given information about the presence of at-
tackers (network-level or state-level) for each psource↔i and
pj↔dest path, the linear program seeks to find the probability
distribution (Pi,j) over available choices of entry- and exit-
relays, for which the expected number of circuits visible to
each attacker is minimized. Entry- and exit-relays are chosen
according to this distribution (defined as Dlp) during circuit
construction.
C. Security is not enough
While our LP produces a relay selection distribution that
minimizes the probability of success across all adversaries,
it does not take into account the resources available at the
selected relays. Given that Tor is a system run using commu-
nity resources contributed by volunteers, load balancing users
across these resources is important to ensure that they are
used efficiently and no single relay or set of relays become
overloaded. Figure 12 shows a snapshot of the distribution
of relay capacities available during the period of this study,
for all relays in the Tor system and the relays selected by a
hypothetical perfect load-balancing Tor client – i.e., one where
each relay serves exactly the amount of traffic that it can handle
(assuming identically sized requests). Here, we see that over
80% of all Tor traffic should be routed through ≈ 35% of all
the relays in the Tor network for every relay to be operating
within its advertised capacity.
In order to achieve load-balancing, we augment our relay-
selection algorithm with information about relay capacities
from the latest Tor consensus during circuit construction. This
is done as follows:
When there are safe entry and exit combinations: In this
case, we select a safe combination according to the distribution
of relay capacities. For example, given a set of safe entry-
and exit- relay combinations E = {(en1, ex1) . . . (enn, exn)}
and the distribution of their advertised capacities Dbw = {en1,
. . . , enn, ex1, . . . , exn}, we select a combination (eni, exi)
with probability Pi =
D(eni)×D(exi)∑n
j=1 D(enj)×D(exj) .
This ensures that no single (entry- or exit-) relay is selected
with probability higher than the ratio of its advertised capacity
and the total advertised capacity of all safe (entry- or exit-)
relays (just as is done by the vanilla Tor client).
When there are no safe entry- and exit-relay combinations:
In this case, in order to correctly minimize the amount of
information gained by the adversary, we strictly obey the
probability distribution output by our linear program described
in the previous section. No attempt is made to balance loads
according to relay capacities. It is important to note that this is
a fairly infrequent case (as shown in experiment E2 in Section
III).
D. Implementing Astoria
The measurement toolkit described in Section III was
integrated with a modified Tor client, as follows.
Integrating our path measurement toolkit with the Tor
client. For standard measurement purposes, the toolkit simply
takes a source and destination address and returns the set of
ASes on the forward and reverse-path between the two.
However, in the context of integration with the Astoria
client, it must predict paths to and from each of the entry-
relays for the client’s AS, and paths from all exit-relays toward
the destination AS (Figure 2). This results in |En|+ |Ex|+ 2
routing-tree computations where |En| and |Ex| are the number
of entry and exit relays, respectively. In order to mitigate the
risk of correlation attacks, by default, Tor restricts the number
of entry-relays available to each Tor client to three (called
guards [14]), and there are typically of the order of 1,000
exit-relays available to a client during circuit construction –
resulting in the order of 1,000 routing-tree computations.
Fortunately, since the source AS and entry-relay ASes are
relatively stable, these paths can be precomputed for later use
by the client. (We observe the benefit of this in Section V.)
However, performing relay selection on a per-destination basis
means that pre-building circuits, as is done by the current
implementation of Tor, is no longer feasible.
AS-aware on demand circuits. First, the Tor client was
modified to perform offline IP to ASN mapping using a
database [38] for every incoming request. Note that since the
entire database (9 MB) is downloaded, the client does not
reveal its intended destination to any lookup services.
Next, modifications were made to the way requests were al-
located to circuits. The vanilla Tor client performs pre-emptive
circuit construction in order to serve requests as they arrive
(increasing performance significantly). This is unfortunately
infeasible for a AS-aware client where relay-selection is a
function of the destination. Although one may consider pre-
constructing AS-aware circuits for a set of popular destination
ASes, the performance benefit is marginal, at best. This is
mainly due to the large number of third party requests for less
popular destination ASes embedded in popular Web pages. As-
toria, therefore, only performs on demand circuit construction.
For each incoming request, Astoria first checks if there are
existing circuits serving the same destination AS. The request
is attached to the most suitable such circuit if it exists.
Circuit construction. Astoria creates a new circuit if and
only if a request arrives for a destination with no currently
usable circuits. In such cases, the client and destination ASNs
are passed to the circuit construction and relay selection
algorithms. Circuit construction is performed as follows:
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• First, a list of entry- and exit-relays meeting the
requirements set by the request were obtained. If the
Tor client is configured to utilize only guards as entry-
relays, the list of guards is obtained. Next, in order
to perform load-balancing, information from the most
recent Tor consensus is obtained to generate the relay
capacity distribution Dbw for each entry- and exit-
relay combination.
• The Astoria client performs lookups to the offline IP-
ASN database to perform mapping between entry-
and exit-relay IP address and AS numbers. These,
along with the client and destination AS numbers are
then passed to our AS-path prediction and attacker
measurement toolkit (Section III).
• The toolkit returns the list of ASes on each forward-
and reverse-path between the client and every potential
entry-relay and the destination and every potential
exit-relay. In order to improve performance, paths are
cached for frequently queried destinations. Precompu-
tation or caching of paths between the client and the
high-uptime entry-relays and destinations and high-
uptime exit-relays also help improve performance.
• The returned paths are checked for the presence of
common ASes in the entry and exit AS path sets.
If there are paths without an attacker, the linear
program need not be invoked. Instead, Astoria selects
a safe entry- and exit-relay combination according to
the generated Dbw probability distribution (described
in Section IV-C). We see the impact of this load-
balancing technique in Section V.
• If there are no attacker-free relay combinations, the
linear program is invoked in order to select an entry-
and exit-relay combination according to the distribu-
tion Dlp that minimizes the probability of the most
likely attacker (described in Section IV-B).
• Finally, once the entry- and exit-relays are selected
according to one of the Dbw or Dlp distributions,
the circuit is constructed. The remainder of the cir-
cuit construction process remains unchanged from the
vanilla Tor client.
V. ASTORIA EVALUATION
We evaluate Astoria along multiple axes. First, we consider
the performance of Astoria by measuring the time required
to load webpages and its ability to be a good Tor citizen
by selecting bandwidth-rich relays. Second, we evaluate the
security provided by Astoria. We show that Astoria constructed
circuits are a good defense against the adversary described in
Section II. Finally, we evaluate the threat from attacks by relay-
level adversaries.
A. Evaluation methodology
Similar to our experiments in Section III, we consider the
performance and security of clients in 10 different countries –
Brazil (BR), China (CN), Germany (DE), Spain (ES), France
(FR), England (GB), Iran (IR), Italy (IT), Russia (RU), and the
United States (US). The same 200 webpages as before were
used for page-loads within each country.
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Fig. 11: CDF of page load times (including circuit creation times)
for a uniform Tor, vanilla Tor, and Astoria client over 200 websites
in all 10 countries.
In order to understand the performance of Astoria and for
comparison with the vanilla Tor client, three metrics were
computed: (1) page-load times3, (2) distribution of selected
relay bandwidths, and (3) overhead of path prediction. For each
of these experiments we considered the same experimental
settings as the vanilla Tor client in experiment E1. Logs were
recorded to extract advertised capacities of all available relays
and all relays selected by the Astoria and vanilla Tor clients,
and time required for AS path computation by the Astoria
client.
In order to assess the security of Astoria and for compari-
son with the vanilla Tor client, experiments to measure security
against network-level (experiment E1), colluding network-
level (experiment E3), and state-level (experiment E4) asym-
metric correlation attackers were repeated using the Astoria
client for page-loads in the same setting (including using the
same guard-set in each country) as the vanilla Tor client (Sec-
tion III). For each experiment, three statistics were computed:
(1) the fraction of websites whose main page requests were
served by vulnerable circuits, (2) the fraction of websites that
any request that was served by a vulnerable circuit, and (3)
the total fraction of vulnerable circuits.
B. Performance evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of Astoria
using three metrics: (1) page-load times, (2) distribution of
selected relay bandwidths, and (3) overhead of path prediction.
Page load times. Figure 11 shows the distribution of page-
load times when using the vanilla Tor client, a modified Tor
client with a uniform relay-selection strategy, and the Astoria
client. We see that the median page-load time with the vanilla
Tor client is only 5.9 sec, while the median page-load time
for the Astoria and uniform Tor client are 8.3 sec and 15.6
sec, respectively. Although this drop in performance from the
vanilla Tor client to Astoria is significant, it can be argued there
are two main causes for this, both of which are unavoidable
to any AS-aware Tor client: (1) It is no longer possible to pre-
construct and re-use circuits to the same degree as the vanilla
Tor client, and (2) There is a non-negligible amount of time
spent for computing paths and checking for the presence of
attackers on these paths.
3The Selenium driver.get() method was used to detect the end of
page-loads.
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Load balancing. Astoria aims to balance load from clients
across all relays in the Tor network so that no single set of
relays are overloaded. Figure 12 demonstrates the closeness
of the load-balancing of the Astoria client with the vanilla Tor
client and the perfect load-balancing client. We see that in
spite of performing AS-aware relay-selection, Astoria is able
to perform load-balancing at least as well as the vanilla Tor
client, with neither of them achieving a perfect distribution.
The results of this experiment allow us to confirm our
hypothesis that the reduction in performance from the vanilla
Tor client to Astoria is indeed because of our inability to
preconstruct circuits and delays due to path computation, and
not due to poor relay-selection.
Overhead of path prediction. Figure 13 shows the CDF of
the total amount of time spent on computing AS paths, for each
site. We see that for about 50% of all sites (200 sites in each of
10 countries), the time spent on path computation is negligible.
This is due to the high frequency of repeated occurrences of
destination ASes in our 200 sites – resulting in the AS path for
each exit-relay to that destination already being in the toolkit’s
cache. In 60% of the cases where responses were not cached
(and 86% of the cases, overall), computing AS paths required
under 4 seconds.
C. Security against network-level attackers
In this section, Astoria is evaluated and compared with the
vanilla Tor client by measuring its success in defending against
various attackers performing asymmetric correlation attacks. A
summary of all results are provided in Table III.
E1: Measuring vulnerability to network-level attacks. In
this experiment, we compare the security provided by the
Astoria client with the vanilla Tor client, against network-level
adversaries. The threat from such adversaries is significantly
reduced from up to 40% of all circuits being vulnerable to
3%, with the Astoria client. Figures 14a and 14b breaks down
the results of this experiment by country. We see that Astoria
completely removes the threat of network-level attackers on
circuits carrying the main page request in clients from Brazil,
France, and Iran, while bringing the risk down to under 5% in
six other countries.
E3: Measuring the impact of sibling ASes. We find
that siblings have little impact on the security provided by
Astoria. Over all circuits constructed by Astoria, the addition
of colluding sibling ASes resulted in less than a 3% increase
in number of vulnerable circuits, with the only significant
increase being in Germany (DE). This is illustrated in Figures
14c and 14d. This large increase in number of vulnerable
circuits indicates that if sibling ASes in Germany were to
collude, Astoria (given the VPN client location and selected
entry-guards) is often left with no safe entry- and exit- relay
options for circuit construction. It is important to note that
although there are a significant number of vulnerable circuits
created by Astoria, these circuits are constructed using our
linear program (Eq. 2) which minimizes the number of circuits
visible to each attacker.
E4: Measuring the impact of state-level adversaries. As-
toria performs reasonably well even against state-level adver-
saries by reducing the fraction of potentially vulnerable circuits
from 85% (vanilla Tor) to 25%, over all countries. The per
country breakdown is illustrated in Figures 14e and 14f. The
results show a steep decrease in the ratio of vulnerable websites
for all countries except the United States (US). This is due to
the large presence of American ASes on paths to and from
our US VPN vantage point and the entry-guards and any Tor
exit-relay and our US destinations.
Defending against active network-level attacks. Astoria
focuses on adversaries who may lie on asymmetric network
paths between the client and entry; and exit and destination,
respectively. However, Sun et al. [39] highlight attacks based,
not only on static path properties, but also dynamics of BGP
(e.g., hijacks, routing instability). Taking this sort of attack
into account is challenging as it requires realtime access to
interdomain routing data and intelligent analysis to identify
incidents that may impact the safety of the client’s path. In
the future, we plan to integrate subscriptions to BGP hijack
data sources (e.g., Argus [36], or ongoing efforts at building
a real-time interception detector [12]) into Astoria to allow it
to operate on dynamic BGP paths.
D. Security against relay-level attackers
In order to defend against relay-level attackers, Astoria
inherits the concept of entry-guards from the vanilla Tor client
and also ensures that no two relays from the same family are
placed on the same circuit. However, due to its AS-awareness,
Astoria (and any AS-aware client that constructs circuits which
are a function of the destination AS) currently is vulnerable
to two relay-level attacks: (1) it is possible for a middle-relay
in an Astoria constructed circuit to narrow down the set of
possible (source, destination) AS pairs that are at either end
of the circuit (based on the selected entry- and exit-relays),
and (2) when Astoria is used from regions with no safe (entry,
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Client Network-level (E1) Colluding network-level (E3) State-level (E4)
Websites
(Main)
Websites
(Any)
Circuits (All) Websites
(Main)
Websites
(Any)
Circuits (All) Websites
(Main)
Websites
(Any)
Circuits (All)
Astoria 3% 8% 2% 6% 13% 5% 27% 34% 25%
Vanilla Tor 37% 53% 40% 40% 56% 42% 82% 88% 85%
TABLE III: Astoria vs. vanilla Tor: An estimate of the threat faced from various attackers.
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(a) Any request vs. Single AS adversaries [Experiment E1]
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(b) Main request vs. Single AS adversaries [Experiment E1]
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(c) Any request vs. Sibling AS adversaries [Experiment E3]
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(d) Main request vs. Sibling AS adversaries [Experiment E3]
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(e) Any request vs. State-level adversaries [Experiment E4]
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
BR CN DE ES FR GB IR IT RU US All
W
eb
si
te
s 
us
in
g 
vu
ln
er
ab
le
 c
irc
ui
ts
 (%
)
Vanilla Tor (main) Astoria (main)
(f) Main request vs. State-level adversaries [Experiment E4]
Fig. 14: Astoria vs. vanilla Tor: Percentage of websites using vulnerable circuits for their main request or any request, against various adversaries.
exit) relay options, it is possible for a relay-level attacker to
force Astoria to create circuits that can be de-anonymized by
it. Below, we discuss these attacks, their impact, and how to
mitigate them.
Measuring the threat posed by middle-relays. As seen in
Table III, in a majority of all cases, Astoria is able to find
a safe pair of entry- and exit-relays to use for its circuits.
As a result, an adversarial middle-relay working under the
assumption that Astoria always constructs safe circuits, will
be able to narrow down the set of possible source- and
destination-ASes by simply observing the entry- and exit-
relays in the circuit. Below, using the results of experiment
E2 and statistical inference techniques, we show that the threat
from such adversarial relays is negligible.
First, given our random sample of 100 source ASes for
each country (and fixed set of destinations) we infer the
mean number of (source, destination) pairs with greater than
50% safe entry- and exit-relay pair options for the entire
population of source ASes in each country (with the same
fixed destinations). Then, we find a lower-bound estimate on
the expected number of (source, destination) AS pairs that have
each (entry, exit) pair as a safe option – i.e., a lower-bound on
the number of (source, destination) pairs that can be linked to
the circuit by a middle-relay in a single observation. Finally,
we show that given the current distribution of Tor relays, the
probability of narrowing down this set of sources to a single
(source, destination) pair is negligible.
Inferring the mean number of (source, destination) pairs
with greater than 50% safe options. Recall that in experiment
E2, 100 source ASes were selected at random from the set
of all ASes in each country. The experiment considers the
destination ASes generated by the loading of 200 non-random
destinations. Let the set of sampled source ASes be denoted
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by X¯ and the set of destination ASes be denoted by D. From
the results of the experiment, we extract the mean fraction of
(x¯ ∈ X¯ , d ∈ D) pairs which have more than 50% safe entry-
and exit-relay options (denoted by µX¯,D). Let X denote the
set of all ASes within each country. Now, using the central
limit theorem and the sampling distribution of the sample
means [34], we infer the 99% confidence-interval for the mean
fraction of (x ∈ X , d ∈ D) pairs which have more than 50%
safe entry- and exit-relay options (denoted by µX,D).
Estimating a lower-bound on linkable sources. We take an
extremely conservative approach to derive this lower-bound.
First, we use the lower value of µX,D from our 99% confidence
interval. Further, we assume that µX,D fraction of our (x ∈ X ,
d ∈ D) pairs have only exactly 50% safe entry- and exit-
relay options (although µX,D denotes the fraction of (x ∈ X ,
d ∈ D) pairs with greater than 50% safe options). Finally,
we assume that the remaining 1 − µX,D fraction of (x ∈ X ,
d ∈ D) pairs have no safe options. Given these assumptions,
we can compute the lower-bound on the expected number
of (x ∈ X, d ∈ D) pairs which have each (entry, exit)
pair as a safe option (denoted by E[Sen,ex]) as: E[Sen,ex]
= Total safe circuitsTotal (entry, exit) pairs = .50× µX,D × |X| × |D|.
E[Sen,ex] is a lower-bound on the expected number of
linkable source and destination pairs for each observation of
an entry- and exit-relay (under the conservative assumption
that an adversarial middle-relay knows the country in which
the client is located and the set of all possible destinations D
that any client may connect to).
Estimating the probability of complete de-anonymization.
Given that E[Sen,ex] is the number of (x ∈ X, d ∈ D) pairs
that are linkable to a single observation of an (entry, exit)
pair and assuming a constant rate of reduction in linkable
pairs (given by E[Sen,ex]|X|×|D| ), the number of circuits that need
to be observed by the adversarial middle-relay to narrow
down the number of (x ∈ X, d ∈ D) pairs to 1 – i.e., to
completely de-anonymize the source and destination – is n =
− log(|X|×|D|)
log(E[Sen,ex])−log(|X|×|D|) (since (
E[Sen,ex]
|X|×|D| )
n = 1|X|×|D| ).
Since Astoria (1) constructs new circuits only if there are
no existing circuits that serve the same destination AS, and
(2) selects middle-relays for each new circuit according the
the bandwidth distribution of relays, we obtain the expected
upper-bound of the probability of a middle-relay being able
to observe n circuits between the same source and destination
ASes (with different entry- and exit-relays). Table IV shows
that this probability (denoted by Pn) is negligible even for the
Tor relay with the current highest advertised bandwidth where
the probability of selection as the middle-relay is .007.
Defending against attacks due to predictable relay-selection
when there are no safe options. In certain client locations
(e.g., some ASes in China and Iran), there are no safe entry-
and exit-relay selections for some destinations, regardless of
the guards used by the client. In these cases, a relay-level
adversary may place entry-and exit-relays in ASes that provide
a safe-path for Astoria clients attempting to connect to specific
target destinations. This manipulates Astoria into using the
adversarial (entry, exit) pair on all circuits connecting the client
to the target destination – allowing trivial de-anonymization of
the user.
|X| |D| µX¯,D 99%CI
µX,D
E [S] n Pbnc
BR 3,515 165 .40 (.39, .41) 114,797 8.1 5.7
×10−18
CN 1,227 131 .44 (.43, .46) 35,216 7.8 8.2
×10−16
DE 2,022 190 .33 (.33, .34) 63,409 7.1 8.2
×10−16
ES 703 181 .40 (.39, .41) 25,295 7.2 8.2
×10−16
FR 1,251 187 .32 (.31, .33) 36,448 6.6 1.1
×10−13
GB 2,372 187 .35 (.34, .36) 76,473 7.3 8.2
×10−16
IR 470 133 .39 (.38, .40) 11,878 6.6 1.1
×10−13
IT 932 201 .29 (.28, .30) 26,800 6.2 1.1
×10−13
RU 5,868 178 .27 (.26, .28) 140,201 6.9 1.1
×10−13
US 23,588 188 .45 (.44, .46) 977,768 10.1 2.8
×10−22
TABLE IV: Results from statistical analysis of the expected upper-
bound of the threat posed by adversarial middle-relays on Astoria
(using data obtained from our simulation experiment (E2).
Astoria can defend against such attacks by selecting from
safe (entry, exit) pairs only when a minimum threshold of
available safe (entry, exit) pairs is met. In cases where the
threshold is not met, Astoria may discard the few remaining
safe pairs and choose entry- and exit-relays according to the
distribution produced by its linear program (Eq. 2), which
minimizes the amount of information gained by the network-
level adversary. This however, enables correlation attacks by
selected network-level attackers. Since it is not yet clear if
network-level adversaries pose a larger threat than relay-level
adversaries. Therefore, determining this threshold is a non-
trivial open research problem.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we compare the Astoria Tor client with
the hypothetical perfect Tor client and discuss how Astoria
can be augmented and improved with recent and ongoing
developments from the network measurement community.
A. Comparing Astoria and the perfect Tor client
Here we point out some of the shortcomings of Astoria
when compared to the perfect Tor client. We find that many
of these apply to any AS-aware client. The perfect Tor client
is able to simultaneously achieve three conflicting goals:
Defend against network-level attackers. The perfect Tor
client is able to prevent compromise from network-level at-
tackers. In particular, the client constructs circuits that are safe
from traffic correlation attacks.
While such adversaries are largely ignored by the vanilla
Tor client, Astoria successfully deals with them by utilizing
efficient path-prediction tools to explicitly avoid relays that
enable correlation attacks. However, Astoria does not currently
deal with attacks from active network-level adversaries that are
able to exploit BGP dynamics. In addition, Astoria is unable to
exactly predict the paths that will be utilized to communicate
with each Tor relay, and therefore only makes estimates (which
are validated to be reasonably tight estimates).
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Defend against relay-level attackers. Since the Tor network
is volunteer driven, it is critical for the perfect Tor client to
be able to defend against passive and active attackers that are
able to control a fraction of all relays within the network.
This primarily involves (1) constructing circuits so that the
probability of an adversarial pair of relays occupying the entry-
and exit-hop of the circuit is low, and (2) ensuring that no
single relay should be able to conclusively link the source and
destination of the circuits it is on.
While the vanilla Tor client is able to successfully mitigate
threats from many types of relay-level attacks, we find that
this is challenging for AS-aware clients such as Astoria. First,
while the concept of entry-guards mitigates many threats from
relay-level attackers, it has a negative influence on the number
of safe circuits that can be built by AS-aware clients. Second,
AS-aware circuits inherently leak some information about the
source and destination of the circuit. Our analysis in Section
V-D shows that in the average-case, Astoria circuits are safe
from de-anonymization due to these leaks.
Maintain performance and load-balancing. The perfect Tor
client must also perform load-balancing to ensure that no single
set of relays in the network are overloaded, while providing
reasonable performance for all its users.
In Section V we demonstrated that Astoria performs load-
balancing in an identical manner to the vanilla Tor client and
page-loads are only slightly slower in most cases. There are
two main reasons for Astoria’s increased page-load times: (1)
Path prediction is expensive, and (2) Astoria loses the ability
to pre-emptively construct circuits. While (1) is unavoidable,
there are interesting future research questions regarding (2)
– e.g., can smart caching and pre-emptive/predictive circuit
construction for a set of popular/predicted destinations result
in significant performance gains?
B. Improving path-prediction accuracy
Measuring the potential threat of correlation attacks is
made challenging by the fact that it requires measuring both
forward and reverse network paths between the client and
entry, and exit and destination, respectively. Thus, we opt
to leverage an up-to-date map of the Internet’s topology,
augmented with inferred business relationships between net-
works and a model of routing policies to infer network paths.
Modeling of interdomain routing is a thorny issue and we
take care to avoid well known pitfalls including complex
business relationships (e.g., ASes that act as a customer in one
geographic region, and a peer in others) and sibling ASes (ie.,
multiple ASes which correspond to a single organization). The
issue of siblings ASes is particularly relevant in our context,
as multiple ASes controlled by a single organization may
share information to perform a correlation attack. Despite all
this, accurate path prediction remains an open challenge. In a
related study, we validate the accuracy of this approach and
find that measured paths follow this model 65-85% of the time
[10]. As a result, the numbers we observe should be taken as
an estimate of the threat.
We note that novel path measurement tools are on the
horizon (e.g., Sibyl [17]) that take into account richer vantage
point sets than prior work (e.g., PlanetLab used by iPlane [28]
vs. RIPE Atlas [35] used by Sibyl). An interesting future
direction is determining how such measurement planes can
be integrated into a Tor client (e.g., to operate in an offline
mode or via a secured querying interface).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have leveraged highly-optimized algorithmic simula-
tions of interdomain routing on empirically-derived AS-level
topologies to quantify the potential for correlation attacks
where an adversary can leverage asymmetric Internet routing
and collude with others within the same organization. Our
results show that a significant number of Tor circuits are
vulnerable to AS- and state-level attackers.
To mitigate the threat from such attackers, we developed
Astoria—an AS-aware Tor client. Beyond providing a high-
level of security against these attacks, Astoria also has perfor-
mance that is within a reasonable distance from the current Tor
client. Also, unlike other AS-aware Tor clients, Astoria also
considers how circuits should be built in the worst case, i.e.,
when there are no safe relays available to the client. Further,
Astoria is a good network citizen and is designed to ensure
that the all circuits created by it are load-balanced across the
volunteer-driven Tor network.
Our work highlights the importance of applying current
models and data from network measurements to inform relay
selection so as to protect against timing attacks. Astoria also
opens multiple avenues for future work such as integrating
real-time hijack and interception detection systems (to fully
counter RAPTOR [39] attacks) and understanding how new
measurement services can be leveraged by a Tor client without
defeating anonymity.
Source code: The source code of the Astoria client is available
under the CRAPL 4 license at http://nrg.cs.stonybrook.edu/
astoria-as-aware-relay-selection-for-tor/.
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